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THE KAYE, SCHOLER ASSET FREEZE:
THE WRONG FREEZE AGAINST
THE WRONG PARTY
ERIC R. LEVINE*
Prior to my return to private practice in November 1992, I spent
two years as a senior trial attorney with the Office of Thrift Super-
vision ("OTS"), Enforcement and Litigation-East Division located
in Jersey City, New Jersey. This division was created to investi-
gate and prosecute "insider abuse" in the wake of the savings and
loan crisis. Part of our marching orders from Washington was to
test the outer limits of the then recently enacted Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA")1
as it related to the breadth of OTS's jurisdictional authority and
ability to sanction those over whom the agency could establish
such jurisdiction. In particular, we were encouraged to focus on
the abuse of attorneys and other professionals, such as appraisers
and accountants.
No case better exemplified OTS's attempts to test these limits
than the action brought against Peter M. Fishbein, Karen E. Katz-
man, Lynn Toby Fisher ("individual respondents"), and their law
firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler ("Kaye, Scholer").2
Without doubt, the most controversial aspect of the case was that
OTS imposed an asset freeze over Kaye, Scholer; the individual
respondents; their partners; and their respective family members.
Some critics of the asset freeze, including the New York City Bar
Association, believed that freezes of this sort were being used by
the government to "obtain an unfair advantage."3 In addition, I
regularly heard allegations from lawyers and lay people, that such
freezes evidenced a level of contempt for due process and the
* Mr. Levine is an associate with the law firm of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn
and a former trial attorney with the Office of Thrift Supervision.
1 12 U.S.C. § 1833 (1992).
2 In re Fishbein, OTS AP No. 92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992).
3 See Daniel J. Capra, Attachment of Law Firm Assets by Federal Regulatory Agencies: A
Report of the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at 10.
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American system of jurisprudence which was unacceptable for a
federal agency to possess. While there is some merit to these criti-
cisms, it seems that the asset freeze was a mistake for other rea-
sons. Particularly: (i) as a matter of tactics, the asset freeze suc-
cessfully shifted the focus away from the respondent's alleged
violations, and caused the public debate to revolve around OTS's
conduct; and (ii) as a matter of law, the all important legal ques-
tion of OTS's ability to exercise jurisdiction over and impose sanc-
tions upon the respondents was never addressed.
Prior to trial, Kaye, Scholer entered into a consent decree with
OTS, which outlined the agency's position concerning the duty
owed by an attorney to a savings and loan association.4 However,
as a result of the settlement, there was no opportunity for a court
to find as a matter of law that OTS properly exercised its jurisdic-
tion, imposed appropriate sanctions, and properly defined the
duty owed by an attorney to a financial institution.5 Such judicial
findings would have been important to the industry because bank
insiders in general, and attorneys in particular, need to know pre-
cisely what is expected of them as a matter of law if they are to
satisfactorily fulfill their fiduciary duties. Moreover, the regula-
tors must appear to be fair, consistent, and thoughtful if they are
to build the public confidence necessary to help keep the American
banking system strong and competitive. To the extent that the
regulators can cite to legal opinions to support their positions, the
more force these positions will have and the less criticism and sus-
picion they will generate.
While the Kaye, Scholer case raised a plethora of issues, this
article will analyze two important questions. In particular,
whether: (i) OTS had jurisdiction over the respondents; and (ii)
under what circumstances should an asset freeze be imposed?
As will be discussed in greater detail below, these topics are in-
tertwined. OTS and the other bank regulatory agencies may only
impose sanctions, such as an asset freeze, if they have jurisdiction
over the parties.
4 See Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative Relief From Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler, OTS AP No. 92-24 (Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Final Order].
5 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h) (1992) (providing for hearings and judicial review). The statu-
tory scheme provides that at the completion of the administrative process, a respondent
may file an appeal with the circuit court in which the home office of the depository institu-
tion is located, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id.
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I. OTS LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS
An important issue that received little debate during the Kaye,
Scholer explosion, was the ramifications of Congress extending
the jurisdiction of the regulators pursuant to section 204(c) of FIR-
REA to include independent contractors, specifically attorneys.6
Prior to FIRREA, banking regulators had jurisdiction over and the
authority to enforce cease-and-desist orders7 against a bank, di-
rector, officer, employee, agent, or other person participating in
the conduct of the affairs of such bank.8
With the passage of FIRREA, the concept of an institution-affili-
ated party was created to define the individuals over whom regu-
lators could exercise jurisdiction, thereby invoking their cease-
and-desist powers.9 An "institution-affiliated party" is:
(1) any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder
... of, or agent for, and insured depository institution;
(4) any independent contractor (including any attorney, ap-
praiser, or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly par-
ticipates in-
(A) any violation of any law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice,
which causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal finan-
6 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (1992). This provision explicitly provides that an "independ-
ent contractor" includes any attorney. Id.
7 It is pursuant to these cease-and-desist powers that the OTS issued the asset freeze
against Kaye, Scholer.
S See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1992). This section provides in pertinent part:(1) If, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal banking agency, any insured deposi-
tory institution which has insured deposits, or any institution-affiliated party is engag-
ing or has engaged, or the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the depository
institution or any institution-affiliated party is about to engage, in an unsafe or un-
sound practice in conducting the business of such depository institution, or is violating
or has violated, or the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the depository insti-
tution or any institution-affiliated party is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation,
. .., the agency may issue and serve upon the depository institution or such party a
notice of charges in respect thereof.
Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (1992). This section provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever the appropriate Federal banking agency shall determine that the viola-
tion or threatened violation or the unsafe or unsound practice or practices, specified in
the notice of charges served upon the depository institution or any institution-affiliated
party ..., is likely to cause insolvency or significant dissipation of assets or earnings
... or otherwise prejudice the interests of its depositors... the agency may issue a
temporary order requiring the depository institution or such party to cease and desist
from any such violation or practice ....
Id.
9 Id.
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cial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the insured de-
pository institution.1"
All the violations alleged against the respondents in the notice
of charges were pre-FIRREA. 11 Therefore, the initial question is
whether FIRREA is retroactive for the purpose of exercising a
banking agency's jurisdiction. If FIRREA is not retroactive, only
one of two arguments is legally plausible. First, the failure of
Congress to expressly list attorneys as individuals over whom the
bank regulators could exercise their cease-and-desist powers,
when such an express reference is made in FIRREA, could only
mean that Congress did not intend to provide banking agencies
with the power to exercise jurisdiction over attorneys.
Second, if Congress had intended to give regulators the author-
ity under the pre-FIRREA legislation to exercise jurisdiction over
attorneys, the FIRREA concept of an institution-affiliated party
merely clarified under what circumstances the bank regulators
could pursue an enforcement action against attorneys. Since FIR-
REA was clearly enacted to broaden the powers of the regulators,
it is not credible to argue that OTS's pre-FIRREA powers over at-
torneys were more expansive than their post-FIRREA powers.
Therefore, section 1813(u) must, by definition, describe the
outer-limits of the agency's pre-FIRREA powers regarding attor-
neys. This analysis is the same even if FIRREA was retroactive.
Regardless of which scenario applies, it does not appear that OTS
had the authority to sanction the respondents because it lacked
jurisdiction over them.
The express language of section 1813(u) provides that the abil-
ity of the regulator to exercise jurisdiction over an "independent
contractor" is premised, not just on the individual's status, but his
conduct as well. For example, if an attorney for a bank knowingly
and recklessly participates in a violation of law or regulation, but
the violation does not cause or is not likely to cause more than a
10 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (1992) (emphasis added).
11 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1992). The statute provides that a notice of charges shall
contain:
a statement of the facts constituting the alleged violation or violations or the unsafe or
unsound practice or practices, and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be
held to determine whether an order to cease and desist therefrom should issue against
the depository institution or the institution-affiliated party.
Id.; see also Notice of Charges, In re Fishbein, OTS AP No. 92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992). A notice of
charges is the civil equivalent of a criminal indictment.
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minimal financial loss to the institution, he is not an institution-
affiliated party and thus, not subject to sanction by the regulatory
agencies. 1
2
Juxtapose this to a member of a board of directors that engages
in similar activities without causing loss or the likelihood of loss to
the institution. The director is still subject to any number of sanc-
tions, including: those arising under the regulators' cease-and-de-
sist powers;" a removal or prohibition from the industry or both;' 4
and civil money penalties.15
The notice of charges as it related to jurisdiction stated, inter
alia, that:
As described more fully below Respondents, and each of them,
participated in the conduct of the affairs of Lincoln and
[American Continental Corporation ("ACC")] and were insti-
tution-affiliated parties, in that they and each of them:
a. Provided advice to Lincoln and ACC, represented and ac-
ted as agent of Lincoln before the FHLBB, and partici-
pated in defining the course of conduct by Lincoln and
ACC in conducting their business and in responding to
the FHLBB's regulation and examination of Lincoln's op-
erations as a federally-insured depository institution;
b. Represented and acted as agent for Lincoln and ACC
before the FHLBB and, in connection therewith, omitted
material facts from and made misrepresentations in sub-
missions to the FHLBB that are the subject of this Notice
of Charges;
c. Acted as securities counsel to ACC, were intimately famil-
iar with its affairs and operations and those of its subsidi-
aries and affiliates, including Lincoln, and prepared and/
or reviewed security disclosure documents that were filed
with the FHLBB and other federal regulatory agencies.
d. Acted as Lincoln's counsel and agent in providing infor-
mation and otherwise responding to FHLBB in connec-
tion with the examination of Lincoln in the 1986-1989 pe-
12 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (1992) (defining "institution-affiliated party").
13 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(c) (1992) (statute provides for cease-and-desist proceedings and
temporary orders).
14 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1992). This section provides that the appropriate Federal
banking agency may "serve upon such party a written notice of the agency's intention to
remove such party from office or to prohibit any further participation by such party, in any
manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution." Id.
15 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1992). This provision provides that any insured depository
institution or any institution-affiliated party violating the statute will suffer civil penalties.
Id.
1993]
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riod. Kaye, Scholer and each of the individual
Respondents violated and facilitated Lincoln's violations
of applicable banking statutes and regulations, as more
fully described below."6
It appears from the notice of charges that OTS took the position
that FIRREA was not retroactive because it predicated its juris-
diction on the respondents having "participated in the conduct of
the affairs" of the thrift and not the general contractor language of
section 1813(u). Since OTS could not possibly take the position
that its pre-FIRREA jurisdiction did not extend to lawyers, it be-
comes necessary for the agency to prove that the respondents, as-
suming they knowingly or recklessly participated in a violation of
law, breach of fiduciary duty or unsafe or unsound practice,
caused or were likely to have caused, more than a minimal finan-
cial loss to, or significant adverse effect on the thrift. This does
not appear to have been done.
Certainly no such allegations were made in the jurisdictional
section of the notice of charges. Therefore, facially at least, the
pleading failed to establish jurisdiction. However, OTS also
alleged:
182. As a consequence of Respondents' reckless breach of its
fiduciary duty of competence and due care, Lincoln made di-
rect investments that resulted in substantial losses.
183. As a consequence of the Respondents' failure to inform
the Board of Directors of Lincoln of its fiduciary duties to the
depositors and to the federal insurance fund in light of the
material facts of which Respondents were aware, the Board of
Directors was deprived of the opportunity to take appropriate
action with full knowledge of its fiduciary duties concerning
the transactions described in this Notice of Charges.
184. As a consequence of the Respondents' knowing misrep-
resentations and omissions of material facts in communica-
tions to the FHLBB, the FHLBB was deprived of the oppor-
tunity to exercise its official regulatory judgment and
discretion with full knowledge of all material facts concerning
the transactions and other matters described in this Notice.
185. As a consequence, Lincoln, ABC, and the federal insur-
ance fund have suffered actual losses from the transactions
described in this Notice of at least $275 million. 7
16 See Notice of Charges, supra note 11, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
17 See id. at 79.
[Vol. 8:427
WRONG FREEZE
Even if the "injury" portion of the pleading was incorporated
into the jurisdiction section of the notice of charges, the allega-
tions on their face still failed to establish the requisite causation
necessary for jurisdiction over the respondents. The gravamen of
the allegations against the respondents dealt with their alleged
intentional failure to disclose certain material information to the
thrift's board of directors and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, OTS's predecessor.
The allegations made in paragraph 182, assumed that if the re-
spondents had made the proper disclosures, Lincoln would not
have made the direct investments. Given Charles Keating's rec-
ord, this is a rather dubious premise. In addition, the allegation
assumed that it was the act of failing to disclose that caused the
losses associated with the investments. More than likely, the ac-
tual cause of the losses was a downturn in the economy or a
change in the tax law.
The allegations in paragraph 183 also made a number of risky
assumptions. First, it assumed that the board members breached
their fiduciary duty to the institution and its shareholders by not
knowing what their fiduciary duties were. Second, it assumed
that if they did not know and were told by the respondents of their
fiduciary duty, they would have done something with the informa-
tion. This is unlikely in this instance because the board members
never cared enough to learn of their fiduciary duties in the first
instance. Lastly, it assumes that if they did not know and that the
respondents informed them of their duties, and the board took
some unnamed action, that those actions would have prevented
the loss.
There is also no shortage of assumptions in paragraph 184. The
allegations in paragraph 184 assumed that if the FHLBB had
been fully informed by the respondents of the thrift's transactions,
its interpretation of the law governing the transactions would
have been the same as OTS's. The agency's argument is in es-
sence, that since OTS would have taken some currently unknown
steps to protect the institution, the FHLBB would have taken the
unknown action. The allegation further assumed that those cur-
rently unknown actions, would have prevented the losses.
Therefore, it is quite a stretch to argue that the respondents
caused or were likely to have caused more than a minimal finan-
cial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the insured deposi-
1993]
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tory institution. Thus, it is also a stretch to argue that the respon-
dents are institution-affiliated parties over whom OTS could have
exercised jurisdiction.
II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OTS HAD JURISDICTION OVER
RESPONDENTS, THE ASSET FREEZE WAS A MISTAKE
Assuming that OTS had jurisdiction over the respondents, the
question becomes whether the asset freeze should have been im-
posed. AS discussed above, the asset freeze was ill-advised be-
cause it shifted the focus away from the respondents' alleged vio-
lations and caused public debate to revolve around the OTS's
conduct. If the debate had focused on the respondents' conduct,
the banking industry would have been better served because the
dialogue would have been about the substantive legal issues relat-
ing to attorneys and the duty they owe to the banks they
represent.
Established and accepted standards of conduct would place the
attorneys on notice as to what are expected of them and help fos-
ter public confidence in the bank regulatory agencies. As it turned
out, no generally accepted standards were created or even de-
bated. Instead, such standards were imposed by the OTS in the
final order to cease-and-desist. 18 In addition, the agency fostered
hostility and suspicion among many members of the private bar.
OTS should have been working to cultivate their cooperation to
help solve the savings and loan crisis and making sure the country
did not find itself in a similar situation again.
To help remedy this problem, all asset freezes should be brought
only with court approval and only if there is evidence of dissipa-
tion or a threat of dissipation of a respondent's assets. An
agency's asset freeze power is remedial and not punitive. There-
fore, its primary purpose is to maintain the status quo pending
the outcome of an administrative hearing. If there is no dissipa-
tion or threat of dissipation, the status quo is maintained and an
asset freeze is unnecessary.
A. An Asset Freeze By Fiat
The Kaye, Scholer asset freeze was brought pursuant to section
18 See Final Order, supra note 4.
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1818(c)(1). 9 The temporary cease-and-desist powers of this sec-
tion refer to section 1818(b)(6), which provides, in relevant part:
The authority to issue an order under this subsection and
subsection (c) of this section which requires an insured depos-
itory institution or any institution-affiliated party to take af-
firmative action to correct any conditions resulting from any
violation or practice with respect to which such order is issued
includes the authority to require such depository institution
or such party to...
(F) take such other action as the banking agency deter-
mines to be appropriate.2 °
The OTS view that the "catch all" language of section
1818(b)(6)(F) included their ability to freeze assets is not novel
and has been upheld by numerous courts. 21 The Kaye, Scholer as-
set freeze was unique because of its breadth and the potential det-
rimental effect it would have on the viability of one of the most
famous and successful law firms in the country. The Kaye,
Scholer asset freeze did not just apply to the those individuals at
the firm accused of violating laws, rules, and regulations, but to
all their partners and partners' family members as well. The or-
der stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Kaye Scholer:
a. Shall cease-and-desist from, directly or indirectly,
causing the sale, transfer or encumbrance of funds or other
assets of any nature whatsoever in which any Respondent
or any member of the partnership has a legal or beneficial
interest, whether directly or through any other person or en-
tity, except as provided in this Order. The foregoing shall
not apply to assets used to pay (a) interest and payments of
principal as due on indebtedness existing on the date of ser-
vice of this Order or indebtedness drawn down after the
19 See Temporary Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative Relief From Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler, OTS AP No. 92-20 at 11 (Mar. 11, 1992).
20 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (1992) (providing for affirmative action to correct conditions
resulting from violations or practices).
21 See Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1992) (OTS has authority to issue
temporary cease and desist orders and take affirmative action to prevent dissipation of
assets); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1584 (1992); di Stefano v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.R.I. 1992) (OTS order
and temporary order authorized by federal statute); Paul v. Office of Thrift Supervision of
Dep't of Treasury, 763 F. Supp. 568, 571 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (agency may issue temporary
order requiring depository institution to cease and desist from any violation or practice),
affd, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991).
1993]
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date of this order under the Term Loan Agreement and Re-
volving Credit Agreement, both dated August 1, 1991; (b)
ordinary and reasonable operating expenses; or (c) for capi-
tal expenditures necessary to its business that have a value
either singly or through related transactions of less than
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00).22
When the Kaye Scholer asset freeze was imposed by OTS, the
legal community, predictably, was outraged. Some of the outrage
was justified, while some was not. Concerns over the lack of due
process, were the most compelling. However, all of the criticism,
except for the most irrational, was avoidable.
B. Court Ordered Asset Freezes
There is an alternative to moving for an asset freeze by fiat pur-
suant to section 1818(b) and (c). The Comprehensive Thrift and
Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990 (the
"1990 Crime Bill") was enacted by Congress in November 1990.23
Section 2521 of the 1990 Crime Bill provided for a court sanc-
tioned freeze and stated in relevant part:
(A) In any action brought by an appropriate Federal bank-
ing agency... pursuant to this section, or in actions brought
in aid of, or to enforce an order in, any administrative or other
civil action for money damages, restitution, or civil money
penalties brought by such agency, the court may, upon appli-
cation of the agency, issue a restraining order that-(i) prohibits any person subject to the proceeding from
withdrawing, transferring, removing, dissipating, or dispos-
ing of any funds, assets or other property; and
(ii) appoints a temporary receiver to administer the re-
straining order.
(B) Standard-A permanent or temporary injunction or re-
straining order shall be granted without bond upon a primafacie showing that money damages, restitution, or civil money
penalties, as sought by such agency, is appropriate.24
It is important to note that the standard of a prima facie show-
ing is significantly less than the general injunctive relief standard
22 See Temporary Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative Relief From Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler, OTS AP No. 92-90 at 11 (Mar. 11, 1992) (emphasis added).
23 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1992).




of a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits and irrepara-
ble harm. Therefore, any concern that the regulators had concern-
ing their ability to obtain a freeze was misplaced. In any event, if
the agency is incapable of satisfying the prima facie standard, the
regulator should review whether or not to bring the enforcement
action altogether.
During my tenure at OTS, I successfully litigated one of the first
asset freeze cases brought pursuant to section 1818(i)(4). The cir-
cumstances surrounding that freeze, when compared to those in-
volving Kaye, Scholer, demonstrate why court-ordered freezes,
when coupled with evidence of dissipation, best serve the public
good. In my case, the focus remained on the respondent's conduct
and concerns over due process were assuaged. Once a disinter-
ested party has made a determination that there is a prima facie
showing of a violation, the regulator is shielded from accusations
of being vindicative and arbitrary.
In In re Hartmann,25 a former member of the board of directors
of a failed New Jersey savings and loan association (the "New
Jersey thrift"), obtained approximately $59,000,000 in illegal
loans from the New Jersey thrift.26 Mr. Hartmann did this by hav-
ing his wife use a variation of her maiden name in connection with
the loans, or having his son represent to the New Jersey thrift
that he, and not his father, was the principal in the commercial
entities seeking loans. After OTS began its investigation, Mr.
Hartmann transferred millions of dollars of assets to his family
members in an attempt to place them beyond the reach of the
agency. OTS moved in the District Court for the District of New
Jersey for an asset freeze." A prima facie case was established,
evidence of dissipation was presented,28 and an asset freeze was
25 OTS AP No. 91-27 (June 12, 1991).
26 See 12 C.F.R. § 563.43 (1993). Although this regulation has since been amended, at
the time of this case loans to insiders for a commercial purpose were limited to $100,000 in
the aggregate.
27 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4) (1992). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
In any action brought by an appropriate Federal banking agency ... to enforce an
order in, any administrative or civil action for money damages, restitution, or civil
money penalties brought by such agency, the court may,.. . issue a restraining order
that-
(i) prohibits any person subject to the proceeding from withdrawing, transferring,
removing, dissipating, or disposing of any funds, assets or other property ....
Id.
28 Although dissipation is not an express requirement of section 1818(iX4), I am not sure
that without such evidence, the New Jersey District Court would have granted the freeze.
1993]
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granted.
Clearly this is preferable to the Kaye, Scholer approach, where
OTS never alleged that the firm or its partners were dissipating or
planning to dissipate their assets. Without a threat of dissipation,
the imposition of the asset freeze became a totally gratuitous act
and provided fuel for those who wanted to argue that the agency
acted arbitrarily and with malice.
C. Congress Has Manifested Its Intent to Require Court
Ordered Asset Freezes
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that there are post-FIRREA
cases upholding the regulator's ability to impose a freeze by fiat,2 s
the argument should be made that since the 1990 Crime Bill was
enacted after FIRREA, Congress manifested its intent to require
the bank regulators to obtain an asset freeze only after a prima
facie showing pursuant to section 1818(i)(4). In the event a tem-
porary cease-and-desist order is issued, a respondent has ten days
to move "for an injunction setting aside, limiting, or suspending
the enforcement, operation, or effectiveness of such order.... " 30 It
is at this juncture that the respondent would argue that the
agency was required to make their application for an asset freeze
on a prima facie showing in a court of competent jurisdiction pur-
suant to section 1818(i)(4). While available to the defense bar, to
date, I am not aware of this argument having ever been made
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Our elected officials tell us that the savings and loan crisis is
coming to a close. While OTS should continue to investigate and
prosecute banking violations, the asset freeze should be used spar-
ingly. Asset freezes should be sought only where there is a threat
of dissipation of assets and only after the agency has made a
prima facie showing before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Through such diligent effort, public support for OTS and prosecu-
tion of banking violations, will grow.
29 See supra note 8 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(c)).
30 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1992).
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